Showing posts with label international marketing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international marketing. Show all posts
Sunday, June 13, 2010
The Domestic Biggest Western Star in China
Dashan 大山; "Big Mountain"
Mark Rowswell who is known as ‘Dashan’ (Big Mountain) in China. He is currently presiding as Canada's Commissioner General at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. Although relatively unknown in the West, he is the most famous foreign national who has become a bona fide domestic celebrity in China. He has worked in comedy, dramatic acting and as a television host. Dashan can speak English, Mandarin and Cantonese fluently. Upon graduation from the University of Toronto with a Bachelor of Arts in Chinese Studies in 1988, Rowswell was awarded a full scholarship to continue Chinese language studies at Peking University. Dashan's name and image can often be seen in commercial endorsements for various Chinese and international companies, including Ford automobiles. Dashan is also active as a spokesman for several charity organizations, primarily involved with cancer prevention as well as environmental protection.Mark Rowswell has made such contribution to cross cultural understanding and to Chinese Canadian relations, all without much awareness in his home country. That seem so quintessentially Canadian to me!
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Sunday, April 18, 2010
The Daimler Chrylser Merger: A Lost War of Assimilation (Part 3)
The Daimler Chrysler Merger: A Lost War of Assimilation (Part 3)
Direct meddling by Schrempp from Daimler led to large losses at Chrysler. At first only two more executives came from Daimler to take the rei(g)ns: Dieter Zetsche and Wolfgang Bernhart. The first to be fired was the head of Sales and Marketing. He was replaced by a Mexican Chrysler executive and the CEO spot was given to a Canadian. This indicates a strong tendency to diminish the American contribution and illustrates a negative mindset. Within 2 months, Zetsche had designed a three year turn around plan that called for cutting 26,000 jobs and eliminating 6 plants violating many of Gebler’s Ten Merger Commandments including : Take time to find out what makes them tick, take it one function at a time, get acquainted and find out what drives talent. Meantime, Bernhart alienated suppliers (Gebler’s Commandment: Integrate don’t alienate).
Bringing German staff to America with the mandate of “Fixing the place” was simply the wrong tactic born of cultural ignorance and arrogance. To initiate a reorganization before completing the integration was poor business practice. To then purchase a third of Mitubichi at the same time was arrogance to the point of fool hardiness. In a time of such instability, initiating a restructuring with German executives in American positions was doomed to failure. The cultural differences were magnified in such issues as sexual harassment, smoking and drinking in the workplace and hierarchical and dominance levels. All the differences were magnified in an adversarial environment. Authoritarian tendencies alienated workers at all levels. Insecurity from dramatic and sweeping changes reduced performance and quality.
In my opinion, the Daimler executives were largely responsible for the decline of the value of the company. They embraced the entire deal with the wrong spirit. The right spirit would have been one of collaboration not exploitation. They were not able to hide their agenda for long and when it was fully exposed from the mouth of the liar himself, the Americans reacted like disillusioned brides might- some went home to momma, others pouted and refused to participate and the best of them stood their ground and reasoned until they were ‘divorced’. While one would think that individuals like Eaton who had led the company into the fiasco would have had more fight for the company in him, he did not have the stomach for it.
A CEO with her head on straight would be able to put the good of the entire enterprise above previous loyalties and national insecurities. I cannot understand why errors of the magnitude demonstrated in this case do not have more severe consequences for the people involved. Perhaps it is just the wisdom of hindsight but keeping people in their positions until the integration was completed seems far more logical. Human resources should have been in on the merger from the very early stages dealing with potential issues and smoothing the people part of the merger. The American talent in particular should have been assured of a position for a period of time such as a year or two. They understood their own systems and labour resources. Clear communication of a plan and of the process for moving forward should have been developed. If Daimler had intended for Chrysler to run independently for a period of time that should have been communicated and their progress should have been monitored. Exchanges of personnel should have been arranged to integrate the two cultures. While they did try to educate the opposite team about such issues as sexual harassment and German dining etiquette, they missed the more vital issues of two cultures working in cooperation.
Most mergers fail. The largest contributor to this failure comes from cultures that clash but it can be done successfully. Keeping stability should be a first priority and that is achieved by keeping the lines of authority in tact until such time as the foundational integration is accomplished. According to Gebler’s research there are rules to follow to beat the odds: 1. Don't act like a conqueror. 2. Find out what makes the new team tick. 3. Take it one function at a time. 4. Integrate, don't alienate. 5. Get acquainted. 6. Understand what drives talent. 7. Don't assume you will be heard. 8. Bridge the gap. 9. Lend an ear. 10. Anticipate some clash. Daimler’s more dominant executive not only violated these rules but they destabilized Chrysler with lies and poor human resource practices. In the process they guaranteed the failure of the enterprise.
Direct meddling by Schrempp from Daimler led to large losses at Chrysler. At first only two more executives came from Daimler to take the rei(g)ns: Dieter Zetsche and Wolfgang Bernhart. The first to be fired was the head of Sales and Marketing. He was replaced by a Mexican Chrysler executive and the CEO spot was given to a Canadian. This indicates a strong tendency to diminish the American contribution and illustrates a negative mindset. Within 2 months, Zetsche had designed a three year turn around plan that called for cutting 26,000 jobs and eliminating 6 plants violating many of Gebler’s Ten Merger Commandments including : Take time to find out what makes them tick, take it one function at a time, get acquainted and find out what drives talent. Meantime, Bernhart alienated suppliers (Gebler’s Commandment: Integrate don’t alienate).
Bringing German staff to America with the mandate of “Fixing the place” was simply the wrong tactic born of cultural ignorance and arrogance. To initiate a reorganization before completing the integration was poor business practice. To then purchase a third of Mitubichi at the same time was arrogance to the point of fool hardiness. In a time of such instability, initiating a restructuring with German executives in American positions was doomed to failure. The cultural differences were magnified in such issues as sexual harassment, smoking and drinking in the workplace and hierarchical and dominance levels. All the differences were magnified in an adversarial environment. Authoritarian tendencies alienated workers at all levels. Insecurity from dramatic and sweeping changes reduced performance and quality.
In my opinion, the Daimler executives were largely responsible for the decline of the value of the company. They embraced the entire deal with the wrong spirit. The right spirit would have been one of collaboration not exploitation. They were not able to hide their agenda for long and when it was fully exposed from the mouth of the liar himself, the Americans reacted like disillusioned brides might- some went home to momma, others pouted and refused to participate and the best of them stood their ground and reasoned until they were ‘divorced’. While one would think that individuals like Eaton who had led the company into the fiasco would have had more fight for the company in him, he did not have the stomach for it.
A CEO with her head on straight would be able to put the good of the entire enterprise above previous loyalties and national insecurities. I cannot understand why errors of the magnitude demonstrated in this case do not have more severe consequences for the people involved. Perhaps it is just the wisdom of hindsight but keeping people in their positions until the integration was completed seems far more logical. Human resources should have been in on the merger from the very early stages dealing with potential issues and smoothing the people part of the merger. The American talent in particular should have been assured of a position for a period of time such as a year or two. They understood their own systems and labour resources. Clear communication of a plan and of the process for moving forward should have been developed. If Daimler had intended for Chrysler to run independently for a period of time that should have been communicated and their progress should have been monitored. Exchanges of personnel should have been arranged to integrate the two cultures. While they did try to educate the opposite team about such issues as sexual harassment and German dining etiquette, they missed the more vital issues of two cultures working in cooperation.
Most mergers fail. The largest contributor to this failure comes from cultures that clash but it can be done successfully. Keeping stability should be a first priority and that is achieved by keeping the lines of authority in tact until such time as the foundational integration is accomplished. According to Gebler’s research there are rules to follow to beat the odds: 1. Don't act like a conqueror. 2. Find out what makes the new team tick. 3. Take it one function at a time. 4. Integrate, don't alienate. 5. Get acquainted. 6. Understand what drives talent. 7. Don't assume you will be heard. 8. Bridge the gap. 9. Lend an ear. 10. Anticipate some clash. Daimler’s more dominant executive not only violated these rules but they destabilized Chrysler with lies and poor human resource practices. In the process they guaranteed the failure of the enterprise.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
Flying new Colors
This music video by Vanessa Williams may have been part of your childhood but it captures many of the important themes for marketers today. Perhaps it is a good time for a refresher course in the current values of consumers. I hope you'll take the time to listen to this song. The lyrics capture much that we should be paying attention to - and it is from Disney- one of the world's best marketers.
Daimler Chrysler Merger (Part 2)
The Daimler Chrysler Merger: A Lost War of Assimilation (Part 2)
It seems to me that Daimler had initially intended to allow Chrysler to continue to run its own show at least for a time. Problems started even before the merger was announced, however, when the integration teams functioned poorly. The Americans were submerged by the Germans in every aspect of announcement and communication. While initial media coverage was favourable, it went sour quickly once Schrempp revealed his deception.
The initial problem was that many Chrysler executives saw the deal and its ramifications and chose to leave. This is the point at which I believe the war was lost. Four VPs left in the first 3 months. Some went to Ford and others to GM. Chrysler’s decline did not start when staff was replaced. It came through initial neglect and confusion including lack of direction and security. The company needed to communicate quickly with the key executives to assure them of their importance and their mandate. From 1998 to 2001 Chrysler was not taken over nor was it granted an equal status. It was not until eleven months after Eaton’s retirement that Schrempp brought in his own team and by then the company had begun to flounder. Even a prompt take over would have been better.
Daimler had underestimated what the loss of key personnel and revelation of the deception would do. After the merger, many observed the co-CEO Eaton was withdrawn, detached and dispassionate about the new company. He avoided communication with Schrempp. I attribute this to the reality that he had been lied to and disillusioned. Schrempp admonished him to “act like a co-chairman and step up to the podium” but it does not appear to have had an effect. Peter Stallkamp reported that Eaton “had checked out about a year before he left. The managers feared for their careers and in the absence of assurance, they assumed the worst. There were a good eighteen months when we were being hollowed out from the core by the German’s inaction and our own paralysis.”
The board of directors of the new company was heavily weighted in favour of the Germans. By the end of 2000 eleven top executives had left Chrysler and that included the replacement CEO and the legendary designer, Gale. When Stallkamp left, Lehman Brothers down graded the stock. Analysts wondered in print why there was no place for one of the most talented men in the automotive industry. It was rumoured that Stallkamp wanted to take a slower more unified approach to integrating the companies and that Schrempp had overruled the approach. American investors were worried but the Daimler executive was far more worried about the opinions of the European investors. Morale was steadily declining. Stallkamp was quickly replaced by a German CFO.
(Part 3 to be posted soon)
It seems to me that Daimler had initially intended to allow Chrysler to continue to run its own show at least for a time. Problems started even before the merger was announced, however, when the integration teams functioned poorly. The Americans were submerged by the Germans in every aspect of announcement and communication. While initial media coverage was favourable, it went sour quickly once Schrempp revealed his deception.
The initial problem was that many Chrysler executives saw the deal and its ramifications and chose to leave. This is the point at which I believe the war was lost. Four VPs left in the first 3 months. Some went to Ford and others to GM. Chrysler’s decline did not start when staff was replaced. It came through initial neglect and confusion including lack of direction and security. The company needed to communicate quickly with the key executives to assure them of their importance and their mandate. From 1998 to 2001 Chrysler was not taken over nor was it granted an equal status. It was not until eleven months after Eaton’s retirement that Schrempp brought in his own team and by then the company had begun to flounder. Even a prompt take over would have been better.
Daimler had underestimated what the loss of key personnel and revelation of the deception would do. After the merger, many observed the co-CEO Eaton was withdrawn, detached and dispassionate about the new company. He avoided communication with Schrempp. I attribute this to the reality that he had been lied to and disillusioned. Schrempp admonished him to “act like a co-chairman and step up to the podium” but it does not appear to have had an effect. Peter Stallkamp reported that Eaton “had checked out about a year before he left. The managers feared for their careers and in the absence of assurance, they assumed the worst. There were a good eighteen months when we were being hollowed out from the core by the German’s inaction and our own paralysis.”
The board of directors of the new company was heavily weighted in favour of the Germans. By the end of 2000 eleven top executives had left Chrysler and that included the replacement CEO and the legendary designer, Gale. When Stallkamp left, Lehman Brothers down graded the stock. Analysts wondered in print why there was no place for one of the most talented men in the automotive industry. It was rumoured that Stallkamp wanted to take a slower more unified approach to integrating the companies and that Schrempp had overruled the approach. American investors were worried but the Daimler executive was far more worried about the opinions of the European investors. Morale was steadily declining. Stallkamp was quickly replaced by a German CFO.
(Part 3 to be posted soon)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)